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Abstract
The effect of computers on pure mathematics is investigated. First, some of
the most celebrated proofs between 1940 and present are listed with the role of the
computer detailed for each case. In the second part, the philosophical implications
of the computers in mathematics are investigated by recounting the controversy
following the proof of the Four-Colour Theorem, then the famous Jaffe-Quinn
discussions, and finally the discipline called experimental mathematics is exam-
ined. As a conclusion the empirical element of the computers in mathematics is
analyzed, together with the formalizability of the mathematical knowledge, and
eventually the values of mathematical proofs are discussed.
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1 Introduction
The advance of computers had a considerable effect on most areas of science. In this
project I would like to investigate whether computers affected mathematics just as
much. If we consider applied mathematics, then the answer is a definite yes. Computer
science opened up new problems for mathematics, and in turn mathematics created al-
gorithms for such as file compression, error correcting codes, cryptology, optimization,
model-based measurements, design, database management, and so on.
The effect of computers on pure mathematics is not so obvious, and this is what I
will investigate in this project. The problem will be approached from two directions:
how computers affected mathematical proofs, and how computers play a role in math-
ematical investigation, or theory making.
The first part of the project report will contain a short description of some of the
most famous proofs since the birth of computers, which were either proven with the aid
of the computer, inspired by computer experiments, or unaffected by the computer. In
the second part I will recount the birth of experimental mathematics starting with the
controversy around the proof of the Four-Colour Theorem in 1976, through Jaffe and
Quinn in 1993, and ending with Borwein and Devlin in the present time. In the last
chapter I will draw some conclusions.
2 Computer-assisted and computer-inspired proofs
2.1 1940 and 1963: The Continuum Hypothesis
Some of the most celebrated theorems proven in the 20th and 21st centuries succeeded
because of either the direct or indirect influence of the computer. When we try to
list the most influential proofs after the birth of computers in the 1940s, we ironically
have to start with a counterexample. The Continuum Hypothesis is truly famous – it
is Hilbert’s number one problem – and as of now it is unclear if it can ever be proven
right or wrong.
The conjecture states that if X ⊆ R is an uncountable set, then there exists a
bijection pi : X → R (Woodin, 2001). Or in other words, the cardinality of X is the
same as of R, not less.
In 1940 Kurt Go¨del showed that the Continuum hypothesis cannot be disproved,
and later, in 1963, Paul Cohen showed that it cannot be proved either by the rules of
the standard axiomatic set theory. This result was not affected by the computer in any
way, even though the foundations of computer science lie in set theory and logic. This
shows that the computer at that time was not suited for problems of this kind; even if it
is possible to upload the basic axioms of set theory, it is not easy to program concepts
such as infinity. Perhaps one day a solution will be found based on axioms different
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from the Zermelo-Fraenkel ones.
2.2 1976: The Four-Colour Theorem
One of the most novel and at the same time controversial proof of the 20th century came
in 1976 when Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken proved the Four-Colour Theorem
and this time the computer played a central role in the proof. This section will describe
this proof and the use of the computer in detail.
The Four-Colour Theorem is one of those theorems where the statement itself is so
simple that even a child can understand it, but up until today no one can write down a
full proof in even a thousand pages1. The Four-Colour Theorem famously states that
every planar map can be coloured with at most four colours so that bordering sections
have different colours. The theorem itself was formulated by Francis Guthrie in 1852,
and it took more than a century to prove it after several failed attempts, until finally
Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken proved it in 1976. They published their result in
the Illinois Journal of Mathematics in 19772.
To understand the proof we have to go back to Arhtur Bay Kempe in 1879, who
claimed to prove the theorem, which was shown incorrect by Percy Heawood in 1890.
Kempe’s attempt, however, contains the basics of the now successful proof.
The proof starts with converting the sections of the map to vertices of a graph,
where these vertices are connected by edges if the original sections of the map had a
common borderline. A border is defined as a line and not just a point, otherwise there
would be arbitrary many colours needed.
Other simplifications are needed as well, for example, only three sections are al-
lowed to meet in one point. If we have a map where more than three sections meet,
we just have to insert an additional section there, or in other words, ”stretch” the point
into a section with an area. This may sound like a complication, but it will in fact sim-
plify the proof, and if the new map can be coloured with four colours, then the original
can be as well. Kempe called this kind of map ”normal” and tried to prove that it is
impossible to find a normal map which needs at least five colours to colour it.
In order to understand the basics of the proof, we need to prove that every map will
contain sections with either two, three, four or five borders. We don’t consider sections
with one border, since that would mean that the section is entirely enclosed by another
section, and therefore can be coloured with any colour other than the one around it. A
similar argument is used for sections with two or three borders: if two sections enclose
a third, the middle one can have a color different from the two around it. If there
are three sections around a fourth one, the middle one can get the fourth colour (see
1Appel mentions in a later article (Appel, 1984, p.39) that a full printout of the computer calculations
would require about 30.000 pages.
2Appel and Haken (1977a) and Appel and Haken (1977b)
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Figure 1: Colouring of sections with one, two or three borders. (Note that Euler’s formula
does not apply to the first case.)
Figure 1). This argument cannot be used for sections with four or five surrounding
regions, so we need another method to eliminate those.
The reason for focusing on sections with up to five borders is a consequence of
Euler’s polyhedron formula, which incidentally also applies for maps.
V − E + F = 2
where V is the number of vertices (corners), E is the number of edges (borders), and F
is the number of faces (sections) on the map (or of a polyhedron). This formula holds
for maps as long as there are more than two regions and there is no region enclosing
another one.
If we apply this formula to normal maps (e.g. where there are always only three
sections meeting in a point), then we can find a relation between the vertices and edges,
namely V = (2/3)E. This modifies the equation as follows:
3F − E = 6
Now let’s call the number of sections with exactly n borders pn. Then the number
of all the regions and all the borders in the map will be
F = p2 + p3 + · · ·+ pn and E = 12(2p2 + 3p3 + · · ·+ npn)
Substituting this into Euler’s formula, we get:
4p2 + 3p3 + 2p4 + p5 + (0p6)− p7 − 2p8 − · · · − (n− 6)pn = 12
The above equation shows that every normal map has to contain sections with two,
three, four or five borders, otherwise the formula would be negative and could not
equal 12. Kempe’s argument was that a minimal five-chromatic map (with a minimum
amount of sections needing a minimum of five colours) cannot contain sections with
two, three, four or five borders, but since that is impossible, a five-chromatic map
cannot exist.
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Kempe successfully eliminated the case of four borders with his method of Kempe
chains3, hence proving the ”five-colour theorem”, however, he was erroneous in the
five-border case, which Heawood noticed ten years later. The proof however, turned
out to be too difficult for him (and many others afterwards), until finally Appel and
Haken called for the help of a computer. The assistance of the computer was necessary
since the proof involved checking so many cases that cannot be fitted into a person’s
lifetime.
The final proof consists of finding a finite set of configurations (sets of regions) with
the method of discharging which they called the unavoidable set, since every planar
map (which consists of regions with five or more borders) will contain at least one
of these configurations. This set is just small enough to handle by hand (about 1500
configurations), but the next part of the proof is not. All these configurations have to be
proven ”reducible”, which means they can be removed from the map that contains it,
and the resulting (smaller) map would still be four-colourable. If an unavoidable set of
reducible configuration is found, it proves that there is no smallest map that needs five
colours to colour it. This procedure consists of millions of trials, but Appel and Haken
managed to test them all with a computer program, and thereby proved the theorem4.
This was the first theorem proven by a computer and caused a stir in the mathemati-
cal community. The philosophical implications of this will be reviewed in section 3.1.
2.3 1995: Fermat’s Last Theorem
Fermat’s Last Theorem agitated mathematicians for more than three and a half cen-
turies. The theorem states that the equation an + bn = cn has no nontrivial integer
solutions a, b, c for any integer n > 2. Fermat proved the special cases where n = 3
and n = 4, which both proved to be fairly simple. This might have misled Fermat to
believe that a general proof was equally simple, but this turned out not to be the case
(Cox, 1994). It is implicitly included in Hilbert’s 10th problem as a very special case.
The theorem was finally proved by Andrew Wiles in 1995. This proof was not
aided by computers; however, there were numerous computer experiments which must
have encouraged Wiles to spend time on this theorem. For example Brillhart et al.
(1971) showed that given a, b, c, n if n - abc, then the theorem holds for prime powers
n < 3·109; Wagstaff (1978) proved that Fermat’s Last Theorem is generally true for all
prime n’s less than 125,000; while Buhler et al. (1993) raised this lower bound to four
million. However, around the 1980s new – purely mathematical and human-generated
– conjectures were discovered, several of which if proven, would imply Fermat’s Last.
Wiles succeeded in proving the Taniyama-Shimura Conjecture, thereby proving Fer-
mat’s Last Theorem.
3see a simple explanation in Appel and Haken (1989)
4see Appel (1984) for a description of how the computer was used in the proof
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2.4 1998: Kepler conjecture
Kepler’s sphere packing conjecture has a lot on common with the Four-Colour Theorem
since it is a relatively simple statement, whereas the proof was finalized more than
350 years later involving a large amount of computer calculations. It is Hilbert’s 18th
problem, therefore it can be considered an important success.
While several people have studied packing methods, Johannes Kepler was the first
one in 1611 to state that while packing spheres (for example oranges at the grocers
or cannonballs), the highest density can be achieved by the face-centered cubic pack-
ing method (see Figure 2). In this packing there are always 12 spheres adjacent to
one selected sphere, and the density of this packing in the infinite Euclidean space is
pi/
√
18.
Figure 2: Face-centered cubic packing (Hales, 2006)
The computer appears in one of the several processes in the proof, and contains
about 5000 cases of six-dimensional linear optimization problems (Hales, 2000). Hales
originally needed 70-dimensional equations, but his computer could only handle up to
six variables, therefore he had to reduce the number of dimensions.
The final proof turned out to be extremely long and complicated. A panel of twelve
reviewers were checking it for four years when in the end they announced that they
were certain of the validity of the proof, however, they were unable to verify the cor-
rectness of the computer calculations with 100% certainty. Hales himself is working
on a formal proof where the computer calculations are checked with a theorem proving
software5, but according to him the final formal proof is likely to take another 20 years.
2.5 2003: Poincare´ conjecture
The Poincare´ Conjecture is truly famous, since it is one of the Millenium Prize Prob-
lems, and the only one so far to be solved. The problem was formulated by Henri
Poincare´ in 1903 (hence it is not part of Hilbert’s problems, since those were published
5Automated theorem proving is a large research area in computer science, see for example The Journal
of Automated Reasoning.
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in 1900), and it took the mathematical community 100 years to prove it. The proof is
attributed to Russian mathematician Grigori Perelman.
The theorem states that every simply-connected 3-manifold without a boundary is
homeomorphic to a 3-sphere. The theorem again sounds simple enough, but curiously,
it was proven for all other dimensions much earlier than it was for the 3-dimensional
case. The proof is based on the so called Ricci flow which was an invention of Richard
Hamilton in 1982, and is an alogithm for transforming manifolds into spheres. Un-
fortunately the algorithm had several flaws and didn’t always produce spheres, and
that is where Perelman’s work comes into the picture. With one simple addition to
the algorithm, he managed to blast through the barriers, and produced the sientific
”Breakthrough of the Year” according to Science magazine (Mackenzie, 2006), and
thus proved Poincare´’s conjecture.
The use of computers in relation to this theorem is restricted to visualizations of
the Ricci flow (such as in Rubinstein and Sinclair (2005)). The proof was completely
”human-generated”, however, we cannot exclude the possibility of computer exper-
imentation by Perelman or Hamilton, of which, unfortunately, there is no record in
published articles.
2.6 Riemann hypothesis
The Riemann hypothesis is the odd one out in my list since as of now it is still not
proven. The reason I included it is that there are countless computer experiments cal-
culating the Riemann zeta function for millions of zeroes. Needless to mention, the
Riemann hypothesis is one of the Millenium problems, and also Hilbert’s 8th.
The Riemann zeta function for a complex s with real part greater than 1 is the
following:
ζ(s) =
∞∑
n=1
1
ns
=
1
1s
+
1
2s
+
1
3s
+ · · ·
This function can be analytically extended to the whole complex plane and outside
of the range of convergence. The function has trivial zeroes at each even negative
integer. The Riemann hypothesis is concerned about the nontrivial zeroes, and states
that for such zeroes of the zeta function, the real part of s is 1/2.
The Riemann hypothesis is often mentioned by experimental mathematicians6 as
one of their major example. It is common knowledge that the Riemann hypothesis is
proven for the first ten trillion zeroes, but of course this does not constitute as a formal
proof. Keith Devlin poses a question in one of his articles (Devlin, 2009): let’s suppose
tomorrow a 500-page paper is published claiming to prove the hypothesis. The proof
is then analyzed by a group of mathematicians for many years, when after finding and
6see section 3.3 on Experimental Mathematics on page 11.
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correcting all the errors, the proof is finally accepted. Now what will make you believe
that the theorem is true? A long and complicated article that you have never read, or the
proof of the computer calculations? Or suppose someone publishes a disproof to the
theorem. Would you believe it without a doubt? Everyone has a different answer, but
according to Devlin, for the first time a series of computer experiments have brought
mathematics a bit closer to the natural sciences.
3 Mathematical exploration
In the history of mathematics formal proofs and deductive reasoning were never the
only resources of a mathematician; experimenting with ideas accounts for a large por-
tion of a mathematician’s work, even if there is no record of that in published articles.
In Jean Dieudonne´’s definition a mathematician is ”someone who has published the
proof of at least one non-trivial theorem” (Dieudonne´, 1992, p.9). This view excludes
all those people who come up with conjectures and hypotheses, but this might have
been the general view in the Bourbaki, which Dieudonne´ was part of, which advocated
rigour above all. The view which I will try to reinforce in this project is that math-
ematics starts with investigation and theory-making, and mathematicians cannot exist
without it.
The discovery of computers means the addition of a new ”colleague” who helps us
do our investigations. The empirical content of mathematics has always been debated;
in this section I will investigate whether computers have brought anything new into this
debate, and whether mathematics can be called an empirical science due to the advance
of computers.
The sections in this chapter are again chronological. The first section deals with the
philosophical debates after the proof of the Four-Colour Theorem was published, when
the computer first entered into the world of proof which resulted in some confusion.
The second section recounts the famous Jaffe-Quinn discussions about the separation
of proofs from speculation in mathematical practice. The third section details how
experimental mathematics became a new discipline.
3.1 1979: The outburst of controversy
The Four-Colour Theorem started out a debate which lasted for long years, and the
loudest of all was Thomas Tymoczko. Tymoczko suggested in his 1979 article The
four-color problem and its philosophical significance that the proof of the Four-Colour
Theorem is so different from usual proofs that it cannot be considered a ”theorem”
or ”proof” in the original sense of those words. The two main differences he men-
tions are that computer-aided proofs are unsurveyable and that the introduction of the
computer into the proof brings an empirical element to mathematics. These reasons
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made Tymoczko believe that the role of computers in mathematics ”leads to serious
philosophical problems.” He argues, moreover, that this empirical element in the Four-
Colour Theorem results in the first mathematical theorem known a posteriori.7
The first argument is that no mathematician can survey the whole proof mainly
because there was no printout of the computer calculations, and it is likely that there
never will be. The author states, moreover, that in order to verify the proof, the com-
puter calculations need to be verified using computers. This is true, however, Tymoczko
believes that no mathematician is capable for doing that; he writes: ”mathematicians
cannot work out the missing steps for themselves, not even in a lifetime of work” (Ty-
moczko, 1979, p.71). This claim was refuted by Appel (1984), saying that there are
many other groups of mathematicians who were able to reconstruct the computer proof
(such as Frank Allaire and E. R. Swart, or Heinrish Heesch and Karl Durre (Appel,
1984, p.38)). Tymoczko himself admits that in the case of the Four-Colour Theorem
the tasks of the computer are very clearly defined and the underlying theorems well
established, therefore the level of reliance on the computer calculations is sufficiently
high. However, the author is convinced that this reliability factor is lower than that of
a ”usual” mathematical proof, and that this is due to the empirical element.
Tymoczko suggegsts that the addition of computers to mathematical theorem prov-
ing results in a new paradigm8 for mathematics, where a mathematical theorem can be
proven experimentally, with the aid of a computer. Among his arguments is that twenty
years before no one would have accepted the Four-Colour Theorem as a theorem due
to the fact that it involves computers. But now (as in 1979) mathematicians are more
familiar with computers and accept them as they accept calculators. In fact, nowadays
people accept the computations of machines to be more reliable than human compu-
tations, but that does not confirm the view that the proof of the Four-Colour Theorem
induced a paradigm shift in mathematics. For example Detlefsen and Luker (1980)
argue that computer calculations are not different from human calculations, since there
is always an underlying mathematical argument, and the calculator (the machine or the
human) is assumed to apply and execute the algorithm correctly and actually observe
the results.
When we wish to check the result of the computer that was performing the re-
ducibility checks of the maps in the Four-Colour Theorem, we can say that computers
of that kind have proved to execute their programs correctly. As for applying the algo-
rithm, which is in the case of computers means properly translating the mathematical
formulas to machine language, the program will have to be checked for bugs, which is
7A priori knowledge is independent from experience, whereas a posteriori knowledge depends on em-
pirical evidence. For further reading, see the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu/
apriori/
8Paradigms are a concept by Thomas Kuhn, where a paradigm is a scientific achievement which serves
as a foundation for the ongoing scientific practice. Paradigms have to be essentially different from previous
practices, and should supply a new direction of research.
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not different from checking a series of logical statements for flaws. There have been
vast amounts of purely human-made proofs which are several hundred pages long and
often contain errors of various sizes (for example the aforementioned proof of Fermat’s
Last Theorem by Andrew Wiles, or as an earlier example, the Feit-Thompson theorem,
which is about 250 pages long9). It is often a painfully long journey to find and cor-
rect these errors, therefore the reliance of the computer calculations in the Four-Colour
Theorem (and in other computer-assisted theorems) cannot be called strictly less than
that of human-made proofs.
In the opinion of Teller (1980) the use of computers in a proof does not change the
nature of the proof, but the nature of proof checking. Following this thought, there are
other proofs which work by validating a finite number of cases one by one,10 and this
results in the same kind of knowledge about the theorem as any other logically deduced
one in mathematics, namely a knowledge about abstract entities existing in all possible
worlds. This is different from the knowledge about the physical world in which we
live, where the result of an experiment may depend on the time and place, as well as
the method of observation. These two views are another interpretation of a posteriori
and a priori knowledge (respectively) which serves as an argument for the Four-Colour
Theorem being an a priori theorem.
If we use the word a priori in a stricter sense, i.e. fully independent of sensual in-
puts, then the result of a simple calculation using pen and paper counts as an a posteri-
ori (or empirical) proof. If this is the case, then the statement that 1234+4321 = 5555
is a purely empirical knowledge, since the proof is the result of a calculation, and it
has to be taken that the probability of the result being 5555 is fairly large. I will not
discuss this theory here, since it is not my focus, and many mathematicians believe in
the Platonistic view that numbers exist subjectively and even if we do not know the
result of a calculation precisely, there always exists a true answer independently from
our experience.
All in all Tymoczko’s arguments can be one by one refuted, and in the end it seems
that Tymoczko’s only real problem was that mathematics stopped being a human-only
science. This was, however, inevitable in my opinion, just as is was with all other
branches of science. It is true that – as Thurston (1994) defines it –, the science of
mathematics should advance human understanding in mathematics, and the knowledge
of a theorem being true is not satisfactorily enough. Instead of a collection of answers,
mathematicians want insight.
What we can conclude in this section is that the inclusion of the computer for
the first time in a mathematical proof was necessary and helpful. It did not result in
an empirical proof. Istead of focusing on surveyability, the checkability of the proof
9The Feit-Thompson theorem was the first in 1963 in a series of very long papers in the classification of
finite groups. The classification of quasithin groups by Ashbacher and Smith (2004) is over 1000 pages long.
10Appel and Haken themselves had about 400 pages of hand verification in their proof about the unavoid-
able set of configurations. Interestingly enough, Tymoczko never questioned the validity of these results.
9
should be emphasised which did become different but not necessarily more difficult.
One thing is certain: the power of computers was verified for the very thing they were
designed for, namely the management of lists.
3.2 1993/94: The Jaffe-Quinn discussions
A new thought arose already back in 1980, when in connection with the previous de-
bate, E. R. Swart suggested that proofs which are not fully validated (perhaps supported
by computers) could be assigned a new status somewhere between a conjecture and a
theorem. Swart called these agnograms, since we cannot be absolutely sure about their
correctness, only agnostic, but an attempt at a proof suggests that they are true. Going
further, Jaffe and Quinn (1993) in their article ”Theoretical Mathematics”: Toward
a cultural synthesis of mathematics and theoretical physics openly compared mathe-
matics to physics by distinguishing between ”theoretical” (as in theory making) and
”rigorous” (as in rigorously proving) mathematics. The purpose of theoretical mathe-
maticians would be to find conjectures by experimenting, which would be stronger than
a conjecture due to the empirical evidence (analogous to Swart’s agnogram concept),
and rigorous mathematicians would work on proving these theories. The role of rigor-
ous mathematics is analogous to experimental physics because it serves as validating
the theories.
In this article the authors stress their concern that inappropriate distinction between
conejctures and theorems results in confusion and might misguide young mathemati-
cians. They propose guidelines for how to proceed with the theoretical and the rigorous
work, and suggest a close collaboration between the two groups. Jaffe and Quinn also
warn young students that the basis of a career in speculative mathematics is a solid
background in rigorous work, however exciting the prospect of exploration sounds.
The main point of the authors was to ”welcome and celebrate speculation” in math-
ematics (Jaffe and Quinn, 1994). Thurston (1994) in his reply sees it as extending
the traditional ”definition-theorem-proof” model to ”definition-speculation-theorem-
proof”. Schwarz (Atiyah et al., 1994, p.20) agrees and suggests different namings for
conjectures of different reliability, for example a ”pretheorem” could be an argument
supported by a ”set of technical details” in the author’s words. A conjecture would
be something supported by an analogy or examples, whereas a ”statement” would be
supported by some kind of heuristic proof. He finds the Jaffe-Quinn paper inspiring
and recommends the publication of what he calls ”heuristic papers”. If the author of
that paper cannot find a rigorous proof, then he should let other people work on it,
since mathematics is essentially a community work. Extending this thought Mac Lane
(Atiyah et al., 1994, p.14) proposes a sequence for mathematical work: ”intuition, trial,
error, speculation, conjecture, proof”. He warns that the step after making a conjecture
must be proof and not more speculation. Mac Lane is clear in stating that he does not
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consider something mathematics until it is finally proven. He does not like the compar-
ison of mathematics to physics, since theories in physics change from time to time, but
a mathematical proof is eternal. The comparison of mathematics to physics resulted
in more argument. For example Friedan (Atiyah et al., 1994, p.6) reminds Jaffe and
Quinn that the purpose of experiment in physics is not only the validation of theories.
Friedan alredy touches on the subject of different meanings of experiments, which I
will elaborate in the next chapter. Here, the sequence of events in physics would per-
haps be experiment, theory, experiment, where the first experiment is explorative, while
the second is validating.
This provocative essay from Jaffe and Quinn has drawn a lot of response, both
positive and negative. It coincides with the birth of experimental mathematics, and
even though these discussions were provoked by the interactions between physics and
mathematics, there were mathematicians doing purely mathematical experiments who
could verify the thoughts of Jaffe and Quinn and join in with the praise of speculation.
Considerable changes did not occur in the mathematical practice due to this paper, but
the ideas in it were deep, and we cannot exclude speculative work from mathematics
anymore, even though the real purpose is to produce proofs.
3.3 Present: A new branch of mathematics
In the 1990s a new branch of mathematics was named: experimental mathematics.
There is no longer a debate about its existence, a handful of mathematicians simply
took up this activity. Even a new journal was born in 1992 with the name Experimen-
tal Mathematics. Jonathan Borwein and Keith Devlin in their book The Computer as
Crucible explain experimental mathematics as ”a way of doing mathematics that has
been made possible by fast, powerful and easy-to-use computers, by networks and by
databases.” (Borwein and Devlin, 2009) Experimental mathematics is a way of mathe-
matical investigation using computer calculations. The authors compare the computers
to crucibles where the mathematician pours in a mix of numbers, formulas and algo-
rithms, and see if the result shows anything interesting. The authors know very well
that if they remove the computer from the definition, they get what every mathemati-
cian has always been doing, i.e. experimenting with numbers and ideas. However, the
authors agree that experimental mathematics is indeed a new approach to mathematical
investigation which was previously not possible.
So far there is only one journal which explicitly deals with experimental mathe-
matics, but Borwein and Devlin prophesize that ”mathematics [...] will sooner or later
experience profound change11.” According to them this will be due to the ever increas-
ing computational speed of computers.
The practice of experimental mathematics already began when computers became
11Borwein and Devlin (2009, p.150)
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easily accessible to researchers. The distinction between proofs and experimentation is
already visible (even though the word ”experiment” is not used) in Appel (1984) when
the author distinguishes between the different uses of the computer in mathematical
research. He uses the term ”benign” for those computer calculations which are lengthy
but follow a simple algorithm, and where the result can easily be verified by hand.
He mentions an example, when in 1966 L. J. Lander and T. R. Parkin disproved one
of Euler’s conjectures, that it is impossible to find k − 1 distinct positive k-th powers
whose sum is also a k-th power. Lander and Parkin found out with a computer that
275 + 845 + 1105 + 1335 = 1445.
McEvoy (2008) argues that computer-assisted experiments do not seem to intro-
duce anything new to mathematical practice. Perhaps due to this view, there is a large
PR about experimental mathematics, for example Keith Devlin loudly promotes the
importance of this field in his articles. He describes computers as ”powerful”, but he
does not explain in what sense they are powerful. Computers are excellent devices for
iterating through lists, and fast at executing algorithms, and this ”power” is well har-
nessed by mathematicians and computer scientists. At present there are a few areas of
mathematics where computers can prove useful, and I am curious how the future will
shape. For now, as Jaffe and Quinn wrote, ”theoretical [experimental] mathematicians
must recognize they are part of a team, (...) and must be willing to share credit”. How-
ever, I do not doubt that explorative work is extremely interesting and rewarding even
without the proofs. As Richard Hamming said, ”the purpose of computation is insight,
not numbers”, therefore if experimental mathematics can provide us with an increased
insight, then it has indeed introduced a new element into mathematics.
4 Discussion
We have seen an overview of the most celebrated proofs since the birth of computers.
Two of them were proven with the computer, but incidentally neither theorem is very
useful. A number of other theorems were proven without computers but were inspired
by computer experiments. Computer-aided proofs are not essentially different from
usual proofs, since they result in the same kind of a priori knowledge of the theorem.
Computer experiments can provide insights and possibly empirical knowledge of a
conjecture, but this has to be taken as a guideline only (it is possible that the Riemann
hypothesis is true for ten trillion zeroes but will start behaving differently after 10100
zeroes).
Tymoczko (1979) in his aforementioned article on the philosophical implications
of the Four-Colour Theorem was wondering how the reliance of computer-assisted
proofs will change when computers are able to prove complicated theorems by testing
several thousands of cases. The computer calculations of the proof of the Four-Colour
Theorem were clear enough, but the author imagined a situation when it would not
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be so clear. He called it ”human-assisted” computer proofs. In 1979 it was perhaps
easy to imagine situations like this, however, now, 30 years later there still have not
been attempts made to prove complex mathematical theorems with the computer. The
computers are getting faster and faster, but a computer is not an intellectual partner in
solving problems, and not all of the problems are formalizable.
In MacKenzie’s view there are two types of mathematical arguments, which are
”formal proof” and ”rigorous argument”. The first one is when a mathematical for-
mula is manipulated according to set rules. This is relatively easy to implement on a
computer, and this has been done in many cases. The second kind of proof is rigorous
argument, which is an argument not possible to write down in symbols or equations
(such as for example Hilbert’s 10th problem). This is something only a human can
understand, which is why these kinds of arguments are felt superior to those executed
by computers. By the nature of these two types of arguments, ”formal proofs” are
preferred by computer scientists, and rigorous arguments by mathematicians.
Thurston (1994) explains is his article On proof and progress in mathematics (p.10)
that while mathematics is the most formally complete and precise of all the sciences,
it is still much less formally complete and precise as computer programs. He ventures
that to make the whole of mathematics formally compatible with computers would
require tremendous effort, and we would have to go back to the most basic papers on
mathematics and rewrite the whole. The biggest difficulty would be to create a unique
formal language, since the number of choices of formalization is huge. He claims
that the reliability of proofs and theorems does not come from the formal validation
of each argument, but from ”mathematicians thinking carefully and critically about
mathematical ideas”. He made a difference between ”formal proofs” and ”humanly
understandable and humanly checkable proofs” and claimed that what mathematicians
do is the second, and they are far from producing truly formal proofs which are possible
to put in a computer program. He would welcome that age when such formal proofs
were in abundance. He prophesized it to be a few years from when he wrote the article,
but we know now that it was an optimistic view (for example, Hales predicts that it will
take his group 20 years to produce a fully formalized proof of the Kepler conjecture).
For now we have mostly our humanly-understandable proofs, and it is because the
mathematical community can be confident in the power of the human intellectual and
proof-checking ability.
The empirical content of computer experiments was discussed, but one question
has not been answered yet, and that is: What is an experiment? We can distinguish
between several kinds of experiments. Medawar (1979) for example distinguishes be-
tween four kinds: Baconian experiments, where the scientist is ”trying out” things, or
merely ”messing about”. Even though Medawar (and Bacon) meant physical experi-
ments, such as pouring two liquids together, this could also describe what experimental
mathematics is doing. Aristotelian experiments are to demonstrate a theory, or to make
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the experiment follow the theory; this is not very scientific and not very useful for this
project. A Galilean experiment is a critical one, which allows us to differentiate be-
tween possibilities and show us a way to proceed. This is perhaps the sense in which
most natural scientists use the word experiment (and this book was written for natural
scientists, Medawar himself was a zoologist) but how this applies to mathematics is
twofold. It may refer to proofs, since that is the ultimate way of the verification of
ideas, but it can just as much refer to the investigative work of mathematicians. The
last one is the Kantian experiment, which Medawar explains as a thought-experiment,
but it is analogous to the Baconian experiment, only extended to mathematics or social
sciences.
In the end we are left with two major categories, the explorative and the verifying
experiments, but not everone makes these distinctions. McEvoy (2008) in his article
defines two categories. The first one is when we try to validate theories by, for instance,
calculating equations for a certain range of numbers. This kind of experimentation will
surely not prove anything, but it will make a case for it. The second kind of experimen-
tation, which is analogous to a physical experiment, is when a natural phenomenon is
modelled and observations or experiments are carried out about this model. A unique
part of these physical experiments is the establishment of cause and effect in the ob-
served natural phenomenon. This is not the case for mathematical experiments, since it
is not possible to talk about cause and effect in mathematics. The other difference is in
observation – while observation in a physical experiment is the main method of estab-
lishing truth, observation in a computer experiment means merely reading the output
of the algorithms executed.
This brings us back to the same conclusion as before, that computer-assisted proofs
are not empirical (or a posteriori) in the sense that they do not tell us about the natural
world, but about the abstract entities of the ”mathematical world”, whereas computer
experiments are analogous to Baconian or Galilean experiments, but very different in
nature from the experiments of the natural sciences.
5 Conclusion
The value of a proof is not only the verification of a theorem, but also in enlarging
our insight, and to inspire. Sir Michael Atiyah said that ”any good theorem should
have several proofs, the more the better” (Raussen and Skau, 2005). He is famous
for proving one theorem three times in three different ways, and each of them yielded
different insights into the field. The two theorems proven with computers which I have
mentioned (the Four-Colour Theorem and the Kepler conjecture) seemed to be not the
beginning but the end of a line of theorems. A century-long curiosity was releived, and
we were left with two very interesting but hardly useful theorems. In my opinion, this
is due to the nature of the theorems, and not the fact that a computer was involved in the
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proofs. I agree with Swart (1980) that ”computers are really just a highly sophisticated
and highly efficient form of automated pencil and paper”.
In the opinion of Appel (1984, p.39) the inclusion of the computer might actually
increase our understanding of a topic. It is true if we consider the advantage of an
algorithm over an endless list of calculations. There are, however, fields of mathemat-
ics where computers are of no use, such as set theory (as seen in the example of the
Continuum hypothesis).
Computers did not overtake the life of mathematicians, as it was expected by some,
mostly because the immense difficulties in formalizing our theorems. Many computer
scientists are working on proof-checking algorithms, but the purpose of that is to aid
those theorems which are mainly in the field of computer science. Pure mathematics
as such did not change much due to the computers, only the lives of those handful of
mathematicians were affected who work in the field of experimental mathematics.
Sir Michael Atiyah said once that ”the aim of mathematics is to explain as much as
possible in simple terms.” As long as computers are what they are now, a human-made
proof will always be superior to computer-assisted ones. After all, the search is still on
for a rigorous, purely human proof of the Four-Colour Theorem.
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